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Understanding the reasons for international cooperation is one of the central 
puzzles of international relations theory.  This paper addresses one part of that 
puzzle: what is the impact of prior cooperation on decisions to extend 
cooperation to new areas of policy?  This aspect of international cooperation is 
becoming increasingly pertinent as regional, plurilateral and multilateral 
agreements proliferate.  My specific focus is on why and how the member 
governments of the European Union engage in international negotiations 
concerning the ‘new’ issues of trade in services and foreign direct investment.  
The central riddle is that the EU’s member governments have repeatedly sought 
to cooperate in such negotiations, despite significant differences in their 
economic interests and without having previously committed themselves to 
cooperate.  
 
I argue that the higher than expected incidence of cooperation can be 
explained if one incorporates a fuller understanding of how the European 
Union’s institutional framework, the  acquis communautaire, shapes the 
interaction among the member governments.  The  acquis increases the 
likelihood of cooperation through three specific mechanisms: First, the EU’s 
institutions can constrain member government choices in ways that were not 
foreseen when they were created.  Second, the EU’s institutions sometimes 
increase the costs f or the member governments of not agreeing to cooperate.  
Third, the institutionalization of cooperation among the member governments in 
some areas enhances the ‘appropriateness’ of cooperation in others, and causes 
the member governments, at the very least, to give greater weight to their 
longer-term interests compared to their shorter-term considerations.   
 
The EU is particularly interesting for my purposes as it is the world’s 
most extensive and intensive international organization.  I focus on the EU’s 
foreign economic policy for two main reasons.  First, a common trade policy 
was one of the most central and earliest areas of European cooperation.  Second, 
                                                                 
1 This paper is based upon my DPhil dissertation (Young, 2000b). I am grateful for a 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals Overseas Research Student Award and  a fee 
waiver from the Sussex European Institute, as well as support for fieldwork from a European 
Community Studies Association (USA) Dissertation Fellowship, which was made possible by 
the Ford Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the European 
University Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre Luncheon Seminar on 28 November 2000. I am 
grateful to Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes, Charles Lees, Henrike Mueller, John Peterson, Mark 
Pollack, Jim Rollo, Alberta Sbragia, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Paul Taggart, Dan Thomas and Helen 
Wallace for their comments. Much of the information on which this paper is based comes 
from interviews and not-for-attribution remarks by more than 60 government and 
Commission officials and interest group representatives between February 1996 and March 
2000.  I am indebted to those who took the time to discuss these issues with me.  
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there is a stark contrast between the relatively static Treaty arrangements 
governing European foreign economic policy and the dramatic transformations 
that have taken place in the nature of international economic exchange and the 
agenda of multilateral negotiations since the European Economic Community 
was established in 1957.
2   
 
I begin this paper by discussing existing analyses of EU foreign economic 
policy.  I then challenge these analyses with empirical evidence drawn from 
European participation in three recent international negotiations: the ‘basic’ 
telecommunications services agreement, the multilateral agreement on 
investment and an EU-US ‘open skies’ air service agreement.  On the basis of 
this empirical evidence I posit an alternative explanation of cooperation that 
incorporates elements of historical institutionalist analysis.  I conclude by 
drawing out the implications of my argument for understanding international 
cooperation in the EU and more generally. 
 
UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY-
MAKING 
 
The vast majority of analyses of European foreign economic policy concentrate 
on trade in goods within the scope of the EU’s common commercial policy.  
This focus is understandable as only since the mid-1980s have other trade issues 
– such as trade in services, foreign direct investment, competition policy, 
environmental policy  – gained  prominence on the international agenda.  In 
addition, although the importance of trade in services and of foreign investment 
have increased markedly, trade in goods remains the dominant form of 
international economic exchange.  This narrow empirical focus, however, has 
obscured some short-comings in the prevailing analysis. 
   
This paper engages with three short-comings in the existing literature in 
particular: 
 
•  An over reliance on economic pluralist explanations of government 
preference formation;  
•  A reductionist view of the impact of the EU’s institutional framework 
on outcomes; and 
•  A failure to problematize cooperation. 
 
                                                                 
2 The European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1952, but it was narrow in focus 
and did not involve a developed foreign economic policy.  In 1 957 the European Economic 
Community (and the European Atomic Community) was established.  This is the real core of 
today’s EU.  Although not technically correct, for the sake of clarity I follow common usage 
and use the term European Union (EU) throughout.  
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The last of these is the most significant for my argument, but it is best 
understood in the context of the other two. 
 
Economic Interests as the Source of Policy 
 
Many analyses of EU external economic policy implicitly or explicitly view 
economic, particularly producer, interests as the drivers of government trade 
policy (see, for example, Hine, 1985; Nedergaard, 1993; Wolf, 1983).
3  Hayes 
(1993) is an exception in stressing the role of domestic political institutions in 
shaping the influence of economic interests and in explicitly recognizing that 
governments have independent interests.  Such, more sophisticated treatments of 
trade policy c an be found elsewhere (see, for example, Milner, 1997; and 
implicitly Putnam, 1988), but are largely lacking with respect to the EU.   
 
This short-coming is potentially significant as the EU’s member 
governments are engaged in an institutionalized, iterated process of cooperation.  
In such circumstances, one would expect  ‘diffuse’ (long-term institutional and 
political) as well as ‘specific’ (short-term, economic) interests to matter 
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; North, 1990; Tsebelis, 1990).  Further under a t 
least some circumstances, one might expect governments to safeguard their 
‘diffuse’ interests at the expense of ‘specific’ interests.  Such behavior has been 
noted generally in the EU (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999; Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace, 1996; Lewis, 2000; Sandholtz, 1996).  There are indications that the 
tendency to compromise for the sake of unity may be particularly strong with 
respect to foreign economic policy  (Hayes, 1993; Johnson, 1998; Wolf, 1983; 
Woolcock, 2000).  Such behavior, however, tends only remarked upon in 
passing in the literature.  Its causes and consequences not seriously examined.  
An exception is Odell (1993), who notes that political considerations concerning 
the credibility of EU institutions and the value of joint bargaining strength were 
factors in the British and German governments’ responses to the sanctions 
threatened by the US in the wake of the Iberian enlargement. 
 
A Narrow View of EU Institutions 
 
The focus of the vast majority of the literature on EU policy with respect to 
goods has also contributed to a very narrow view of the role of the EU’s 
institutions in shaping policy.  Under the 1957 Treaty of Rome external trade in 
                                                                 
3 It should be noted that most discussions of EU foreign economic policy do not specify the 
origins of member government preferences.  Government positions in internal and external 
negotiations are simply reported without thorough explanation. (see, for e xample,. Benyon 
and Bourgeois, 1984; Devuyst, 1995; Hanson, 1998; Johnson, 1998; Jolstad, 1997; McAleese, 
1994; Meunier, 1998; Paeman and Bensch, 1995; Pearce and Sutton, 1985; Tsoukalis, 1997; 
Woolcock and Hodges, 1996).  
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goods is governed by the EU’s common commercial policy.  This means that it 
is the exclusive responsibility (competence in EU parlance) of the EU.  As a 
consequence, the member governments are no longer legally entitled to pursue 
their own policies with respect to many trade issues.  The European Commission 
represents the EU in the negotiations, and d ecisions within the common 
commercial policy can be taken by a qualified majority of the member 
governments acting in the Council of Ministers. 
As a consequence, most analyses of EU trade policy consider only the 
impact of qualified majority voting and the Commission’s role as negotiator on 
whether EU policy is protectionist or liberal (see, for example, Hayes, 1993; 
Johnson, 1998; Meunier, 1998; Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1998; Wolf, 1983).   
 
Only a few scholars consider how the EU’s institutional framework more 
broadly considered affects the aggregation of government preferences.  A 
crucial issue that has received little attention except from lawyers (see, for 
example, Barav, 1981; Bourgeois, 1981, 1987; Cremona, 1999; Emiliou, 1996; 
MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett, 1996) and the Commission (1985; 1995; 1996a), is 
how the EU’s exclusive competence for foreign economic policy has expanded 
over time as the result of judicial interpretation.
4  This has obvious implications 
for how the member governments interact on trade issues.  I shall return to this 
point below. 
 
A handfull of scholars have examined how the EU’s institutional 
framework affects the way the member governments interact in other ways as 
well.  Hanson (1998) stresses the importance of the single European market 
program in undermining the effectiveness of national quantitative restrictions 
and the difficulty of agreeing European-level replacements as a driver of the 
abolition of residual national quantitative restrictions in 1994.  In essence, the 
interdependence of the EU’s member governments can, under certain 
circumstances, increase a member state’s interdependence with the rest of the 
world.   Patterson (1997) and Smith (1994a; 1999) emphasize the interaction of 
national, European and international pressures and policies, most notably with 
respect to the 1992 reform of the common agricultural policy in the shadow of 
the Uruguay Round.  Jolstad (1997) points to the Commission’s use of its power 
under EU competition rules to vet government subsidies to raise the cost of non-
agreement for at least some member governments and thereby move forward the 
negotiations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) on ship-building subsidies.   
 
                                                                 
4 A notable exception is Smith (1994b).  For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of 
Community competence, see Young, 2000a.  
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Taking Cooperation for Granted 
 
\The most serious short-coming in the literature from my point of view, 
however, is that the emphasis on trade in goods has also contributed to a 
tendency to treat a common EU negotiating position as the only possible 
outcome.  Some authors who examine the EU’s external policies with respect to 
non-trade issues (e.g., Hill (1993) on foreign policy; Jupille (1999) on 
environmental policy; Rhodes (1998) in an overview of EU external policy) 
recognize that the member governments have a choice about cooperation.  
Because an array of foreign economic policy issues fall outside the scope of the 
common commercial policy,
5 whether to cooperate in international negotiations 
on such issues also requires a deliberate decision.  Cooperation beyond what is 
strictly required by the Treaty has been a feature of EU foreign economic policy 
since before the creation of the customs union in 1968 (Alting von Geusau, 
1967; Lindberg, 1963).  Treatments of such episodes with respect to trade, 




What attempts there have been at explaining extending cooperation in 
foreign economic policy are limited to discussions of the periodic 
intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) at which revisions to the T reaty are 
considered.   Most of these analyses at least implicitly adopt an economic 
pluralist approach.  Alting von Geusau (1967), Brusse (1997) and Moravcsik 
(1998), for example, in their explanations of the design of the common 
commercial policy in the  Treaty of Rome, focus on whether the governments 
were liberal or protectionist.  Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1998), however, find 
economic pluralist arguments inadequate to explain why particular member 
governments opposed extending the scope of the common commercial policy in 
the 1996 IGC that lead up to the Treaty of Amsterdam.  They find it necessary to 
introduce some member governments’ ‘ideological bias’ in favor of sovereignty.  
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis (1999) likewise find an analysis routed in economic 
pluralism incapable of explaining the lack of reform of the common commercial 
policy at Amsterdam. 
 
   
                                                                 
5 The December 2000 Treaty of Nice substantially broadened the scope of the common 
commercial policy.  Nonetheless, some important issues  - most notably non-service FDI and 
transport services - remain outside its scope. 
6 See, for example, Benyon and Bourgeois (1984) on the 1982 EC-US Steel arrangement and 
Bourgeois (1982) on the technical barriers to trade negotiations during the Tokyo Round of 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade negotiations.  
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The paradox I am trying to explain is actually the inverse of this.  Rather than 
trying to explain non-cooperation when economic pluralism would predict 
cooperation, I am trying to explain cooperation when economic pluralism 
suggests it should not occur. 
 
COOPERATION WHERE NONE SHOULD BE 
 
Underlying (usually implicitly) most explanations of EU foreign economic 
policy are the assumptions that: cooperation o ccurs when economic interests 
converge and/or when the common commercial policy compels it.  Significantly, 
as I am trying to explain cooperation, these assumptions are analogues of two of 
the three pillars on which the liberal intergovernmentalist approach to explaining 
European integration rests: government preferences reflect domestic economic 
interests;
 7 outcomes reflect the relative bargaining power of the member states; 
and institutions enforce only previously undertaken commitments (Moravcsik, 
1998).   
 
My cases, however, are selected so as to meet neither criteria for 
cooperation.  In each case, the congruence of government preferences with 
respect to international liberalization was fairly low, although increasing.   In 
addition, the issues at stake in each case fell outside the scope of the common 
commercial policy. Nonetheless, in each case some form of cooperation was 
pursued. 
 
Diverse Economic Interests 
 
Despite nascent changes to policy in most of the member states in each policy 
area during the 1980s, significant differences in the member governments’ 
economic interests persisted at the time when the crucial decisions to cooperate 
were taken.   
 
In telecommunications services, for example, the emergence of new 
technologies, new demand for global communications and growing acceptance of 
neo-liberal economic ideas had an impact on policy throughout Europe, but these 
pressures did not fall on equally fertile soil in each EU member state.  
Consequently, during the latter half of the 1980s and early  1990s the EU’s 
                                                                 
7 I use the term preferences to refer to the preferred policies for realizing specific objectives 
(interests)  This echoes Milner’s (1997) usage.  Moravcsik (1997) makes a similar distinction, 
but uses the term ‘preferences’ for fundamental interests and ‘policy choices’ for what I call 
preferences.   Thus, in my terms, while various actors’ interests are exogenous, preferences 
are influenced by the actors’ understandings of causal relationships between means and ends 
and by their views of what behaviors are appropriate (March and Olsen, 1998). This 
distinction is important as it makes explicit how institutions affect preferences.   
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member governments adopted different responses (Bronckers and Larouche, 
1997; Thatcher, 1999; Smith, 1999). The British, Danish, Finnish and Swedish 
governments introduced competition.  The Belgian, Dutch German, French and 
Luxembourg governments embarked on less radical reforms, such as establishing 
independent regulatory authorities and liberalizing cellular markets.  Other 
member governments, particularly those of Greece, Portugal and Spain, did not 
really grapple with the new challenges u ntil EU policy began to exert pressure 
(Noam, 1992; Thatcher, 1995).  
 
Significant differences are evident in national policies governing foreign 
direct investment, despite increased liberalization sparked by the spread of neo-
liberal economic ideas (Brewer and S. Young, 1995; 1998).
8  The French, Greek 
and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese governments, in particular, are still somewhat 
leery of non-EU FDI (USTR, 1999).  In addition, some countries are much more 
active exporters of FDI to non-EU countries than others. Outward FDI is much 
more important
9  to Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK than it is to 
Austria, Greece and Italy. 
 
Differences among the EU member states’ economic interests are most 
marked with regard to an EU-US agreement to liberalize air services.
10  The 
European airlines’ views of a liberal EU-US air service agreement reflect: the 
relative importance of the transatlantic market; their ability to compete; how 
exposed they are to indirect competition from airlines based in other member 
states; and whether they value a close relationship with a US carrier.  Not 
surprisingly, these factors differ widely among the European airlines.   
 
The transatlantic market is more than twice as important to Aer Lingus 
(Ireland), British Airways, Lufthansa (Germany) and Royal Dutch KLM than it is 
to Finnair, Iberia (Spain) and TAP (Portugal).
11 In addition, the UK dominates the 
                                                                 
8 Witness the variation in the member governments’ exceptions to the OECD’s National 
Treatment Instrument (NTI), the precursor to the MAI  
(http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/country/). 
9 For these purposes, the importance of FDI is evaluated in terms of FDI flows (not stock) as a 
proportion of gross domestic product.  The countries are rather crudely, but illustratively, 
grouped into those having higher and lower than average shares of FDI as a proportion of 
GDP.  The calculations are my own based on Eurostat data. 
10 For most member states such an agreement implied a double liberalization.  Existing 
bilateral arrangements were quite restrictive, limiting the number of carriers and including 
government oversight of fares.  Removing those restrictions would increase competition.  
Removing them in an EU-US context would increase competition further, particularly among 
EU airlines. 
11 These assessments are made based on the share of total revenue-passenger kilometers 
accounted for by transatlantic routes.  The calculations are my own based on Association of 
European Airlines data.  




12  Many European airlines - particularly Air France, 
Iberia, TAP and Olympic (Greece) - struggled during the 1990s, while BA and 
KLM were the only consistently profitable European ‘flag carriers’ during the 
decade (Airline Business, September 1998).  Further, airlines operating from more 
eastern member states are more exposed to indirect competition from other 
European carriers.
13  They are thus more sensitive than their western competitors 
to policy changes in other member states   Lastly, the US offered two 
inducements to European governments to conclude bilateral liberal air service 
agreements: ‘disproportionately’ beneficial agreements (direct access to all 
international airports in the much larger US) and permission for the national 
airlines to cooperate closely with US carriers (DoT, 1997).    
 
Weak intended Commitments 
 
In addition to these significant differences among the economic interests of the 
member governments, there were not clear, firm prior commitments by the 
member governments to cooperate in  the relevant international negotiations.  
This situation had its roots in the Treaty of Rome.   In 1957 the six founding 
governments of what was to become the EU agreed the common commercial 
policy in order to provide the framework for their economic relations with the 
rest of the world.  Differences among the liberal and more protectionist 
governments, however, produced an awkward compromise ( Lindberg, 1963; 
Moravcsik, 1998).  One component of this compromise was that the precise 
scope of the common commercial policy was not defined.  Although the Treaty 
explicitly includes some commercial policy instruments - essentially reflecting 
the main trade-policy preoccupations of the time -  it is silent on others, leaving 
open the question of precisely where the boundary between EU and member 
state authority lies.  Until the December 2000 Treaty of Nice, subsequent Treaty 
revisions did not alter the scope of the common commercial policy.
14   
 
The only indicative list of policies falling within the common commercial 
policy has meant that its scope has been open to repeated interpretation.  I shall 
return to the crucial issue of interpretation below.  Here, suffice it to say that in 
non of my cases did the common commercial policy require cooperation.  At the 
                                                                 
12 US-UK flights account for 40 percent of all passenger traffic between the US and EU 
member states (US Department of Commerce figures reported in Avmark Aviation Economist, 
August/September 1997). An estimated 15 percent of these passengers are destined for other 
EU member states (CAA, 1994; OFT, 1997). 
13 This is because consumers prefer not to ‘back track;’ travel away from their final 
destination (CA, 1997; CFA, 1997).  Thus a German customer would prefer to fly to the US 
via London than via Stockholm.  
14 The Treaty of Nice brings trade in most services  - excluding educational, social, human 
health and audiovisual services  - and trade-related intellectual property rights within the 
common commercial policy.  
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time the crucial decision to cooperate was taken the policy area in question either 
fell outside the scope of the common commercial policy (FDI and air transport) or 
was the subject of a dispute between the Commission and at least some member 
governments (telecommunications).  
 
Evidence of Cooperation 
 
Despite differences among the economic interests of the member states and the 
lack of prior commitments to cooperate there was at least some cooperation in 
each of my cases.  Such cooperation was strongest and most successful in the 
‘basic’ telecommunications negotiations.  The EU pursued a common 
negotiating position, albeit one with internal differentiation,
15 with the 
Commission as negotiator.  In the MAI negotiations the EU member 
governments agreed to cooperate on some i ssues - such as a most-favored-
nation exemption for regional economic integration organizations and effective 
exclusion of audio-visual services - but not on others, most importantly each 
government’s exceptions to the national treatment principle.  I call such 
cooperation ‘targeted.’ This cooperation ultimately broke-down after the 
negotiations ran into trouble over the constraints being imposed on 
governments’ regulatory autonomy.  Cooperation was least developed with 
respect to air transport.  Although  they did not agree to cooperate on the 
politically and economically sensitive issue of traffic rights (market access), the 
member governments did give the Commission a mandate to negotiate with the 
US on regulatory issues (such as the coordination of competition policies). 
   
The key aspects of each case are summarized in Table 1. 
                                                                 
15 The EU and its member states submitted a single negotiating position, but in addition to 
some common points it contained specific reservations by individual member (seven member 
governments submitted no reservations).   See EC&MS, 1995.  




Table 1 Economic interests and intended commitments at the time of cooperative decisions 
Case  Different economic interests  Weak intended commitments  Cooperative decision 
Telecommunications  Public ownership, monopolies 
Different reforms 
Different operator interests 




(April 1994)  
 
Investment  Very different inward investment 
policies 
Major differences in importance 
of inward and outward FDI 




Air transport  Public ownership, monopolies  
Different airline interests 
US inducements to act unilaterally 
Excluded from common commercial policy 
 
De facto targeted cooperation 









If economic interests are not congruent and agreed commitments do not compel 
cooperation, how do we explain observed cooperation?  In the rest of this paper, 
I seek to develop a more comprehensive approach to understanding European 
foreign economic policy and intergovernmental cooperation more generally.  
 
Because the member governments, at least with respect to the aspects of 
foreign economic policy that interest me, have a choice about whether to 
cooperate or act unilaterally, such decisions cannot be treated simply as day-to-
day policy-making.  Rather they involve a degree of sovereignty pooling.  At the 
same time, decisions to participate in specific international negotiations cannot 
be considered wholesale integration; the decisions are substantively narrow and 
usually time-limited.  Thus, my focus falls somewhere between the broad 
categories of ‘history-making’ decisions about extending integration and ‘day-
to-day’ decision-making within established policy areas that have been 
identified in the literature on the European Union (Hix, 1996; Peterson, 1995; 
Wallace, 2000).  As it appears that international relations approaches are better 
suited to explaining ‘history-making’ decisions in the EU while comparative 
politics approaches fit ‘day-to-day’ decision-making better (Hix, 1996; Peterson, 
1995; Wallace, 2000), it is appropriate that my analytical approach draws on 
both approaches.  This is in keeping with the fading of the strict segmentation of 
analytical approaches to the EU (and to international relations more generally) 
(Pollack, 2000; Wallace, 2000). 
 
Rather than reject a rationalist approach outright, I advance three 
qualifications stemming from historical institutionalist analysis (Bulmer, 1994; 
Hall, 1986; March and Olsen, 1984; Pierson, 1996; Thelen and Stienmo, 1992).  
The first follows from the observation that institutions do not always perform 
the way that they were intended to when they were agreed. In particular, in 
international legal systems with binding third-party arbitration (such as the EU 
and to a lesser extent the World Trade Organization), the constraints may 
change contrary to the preferences of the member governments. The second 
qualification is that the commitments entered into by the member governments 
among themselves can affect the costs of not agreeing to cooperate with respect 
to others.  The third qualification is to recognize that membership in the EU 
changes how governments consider cooperation and assess their interests. 
Aspects of each of these mechanisms can be found in the literature on European 
foreign economic policy, but nowhere are they pulled together or treated 
systematically. 
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The Acquis as an Unintended Constraint 
 
The most fundamental impact of the EU’s institutions on foreign economic 
policy is in determining whether the member governments must participate in 
international negotiations through the EU or if they can choose to participate 
unilaterally.  In other words the  acquis determines whether competence for 
particular issues resides with the EU, the member states or both.  Where 
exclusive external competence resides with the EU (as is the case with the 
common commercial policy), the member governments cannot pursue unilateral 
policies. In such circumstances the  acquis establishes clear procedures and 
decision rules facilitate collective participation in international negotiations.   
Where competence resides with the member states, the governments can choose 
whether or not to cooperate at the European level in order to influence 
international negotiations. 
 
  As alluded to above, the allocation of competence for foreign economic 
policy has changed over time, driven primarily by tension between the 
Commission and some member governments over the interpretation of the 
Treaty and by the European Court of Justice’s adjudication of those disputes that 
have been brought before it (Weiler, 1991; Young, 2000a).   The extension of 
EU competence in foreign economic policy has occurred along two dimensions.  
The first is through the gradual broadening of the scope of the common 
commercial policy to encompass policy areas not specifically mentioned in the 
Treaty of Rome.  The second, more dramatic, dimension is through the ‘doctrine 
of implied powers,’ which was e stablished by the ECJ’s 1971  ERTA 
judgement.
16  This doctrine holds that exclusive external competence is 
conferred on the EU when there are ‘common (internal) rules’ that might be 
adversely affected by unilateral (external) agreements or where internal rules 
specifically address the treatment of third country firms.
17  
 
The timing and substance of the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94
18 on the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round was crucial in each of my cases.  It specifically addressed the 
allocation of competence for trade i n services (telecommunications and air 
transport) and foreign investment (telecommunications and FDI).
19 The 
                                                                 
16 ‘Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities’, 
Case 22/70 (ERTA), European Court Report, 263. 
17 The ‘doctrine of implied powers’ is much more nuanced and complicated than depicted 
here, but this crude sketch captures the key points.  See Emiliou (1996) and MacLeod, Hendry 
and Hyett (1996). 
18 ‘Opinion 1/94,’ European Court Report [1994] I-5267. 
19 Opinion 1/94 addressed FDI because establishment was formally recognized as one of four 
ways in which services can be supplied across borders.  Because of this the ECJ heard the 
Uruguay Round Agreement case in conjunction with an earlier case,  brought by the Belgian 
government, concerning the authority to conclude the National Treatment Instrument.   
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negotiations on ‘basic’ telecommunications began in April 1994 just after the 
Commission had requested the Court’s opinion on the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round.  The Court’s Opinion was published in November 1994, shortly before 
the launch of the MAI negotiations (May 1995) and as the tension between the 
Commission and member governments over ‘open skies’ agreements with the US 
were beginning to mount. 
 
In its Opinion the Court held that only the cross-border supply of services 
falls within the scope of the common commercial policy.  Even this was a broader 
interpretation of the common commercial policy than the British, Danish, French 
and German governments supported (ECJ, 1994). It implied that, had the member 
governments not already been cooperating in the ‘basic’ telecommunications 
negotiations, they would have had to, at least on some aspects.  
 
The Court, however, ruled that the other three modes of supply identified in 
the negotiations  - establishment (FDI), consumption abroad and presence of 
natural persons - were outside the scope of the common commercial policy.
20 
The Court also explicitly excluded transport services from the scope of the 
common commercial policy.   
   
Although the ECJ had excluded FDI and air transport from the scope of 
the common commercial policy, the EU had some claim to external competence 
in these areas by dint of the ‘doctrine of implied powers.’   Some aspects of the 
MAI  negotiations  - including financial services and investment incentives - 
because they are governed by common rules fell within the EU’s exclusive 
external competence, and so necessitated a degree of cooperation.  The 
applicability of the doctrine of implied powers with respect to air transport, 
however, was (and is) diminished because the member governments had 
systematically excised references to external aviation relations from the 
Commission’s proposals on liberalizing the European aviation market. 
 
The Impact of the acquis on the Cost of Non-agreement 
 
The acquis also can affect the member governments’ alternatives to cooperation.  
It does so in two ways.  The first is, to an extent, the automatic by-product of 
European integration; it is difficult for a  member government to insulate itself 
against the actions of its partners, including their foreign economic policies.  As 
a result, the effectiveness of a unilateral policy may be undermined.  The second 
requires agency on the part of the EU’s supranational organizations, which can 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Although this Opinion 2/92 (European Court Report [1995] I-525) was delivered separately a 
few months later, just before the start of the MAI negotiations, the conclusion was the same: 
FDI is primarily a member state competence. 
20 The Treaty of Nice did away with this distinction.  
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sometimes leverage the member governments’ commitments in one area to 




As the EU is an international organization as well as an international actor, the 
member states have interdependencies among themselves, as well as with the 
rest of the world.  Their internal interdependence has bearing both on the 
member governments’ preferences regarding intra-EU cooperation and on their 
bargaining power for shaping any resulting common position.
21  
Interdependencies within the EU are particularly intense because the EU’s 
institutional framework prohibits the use against other member states of many of 
the instruments that other governments usually deploy for coping with external 
economic shocks.   
   
Thus the preferences of the member governments with respect to 
cooperation and their relative bargaining power in shaping a common position 
(if there is one) are influenced by the  interaction of their intra- a nd extra-EU 
interdependencies. Member governments of countries that are highly 
interdependent with the rest of the world are likely to favor an international 
agreement.  The governments of member states that are have high intra-EU 
interdependence but low e xtra-EU interdependence may prefer an EU-only 
solution.  Those that have both high intra- and extra-EU interdependencies will 
be in a weak position compared to less interdependent governments when it 
comes to agreeing a common EU negotiating position.  
 
Whether third-country firms can circumvent a member government’s 
restrictions by investing first in another member state was a factor in intra-EU 
cooperation in both the MAI and ‘basic’ telecommunications services 
negotiations.
22  The impact of such indirect  competition is mitigated in air 
services because foreign ownership is capped by EU rules.  Even so, the creation 
of a single aviation market put pressure on some of the less liberal member 
                                                                 
21 Hanson (1998) advances this argument to explain the elimination of residual national 
quantitative restrictions in 1994. 
22  The right of establishment (Article 43 (ex-52) of the Treaty of Rome) prevents member 
governments from excluding EU firms from their markets.  If a third-country firm, by 
establishing in one member state, is considered an EU firm  — essentially an issue  of how 
Article 48 (ex-58) of the Treaty of Rome is interpreted  — then it too can enter any other 
member state’s market.  There is currently an open question with the Commission and a 
number of member governments taking the liberal line while other member g overnments, 
notably that of France, taking a more restrictive view.  
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governments, because they could not prevent airlines from other member states 
from competing indirectly with their national airlines.
23   
 
Manipulation of the costs of non-agreement 
 
The European Commission can sometimes manipulate the member 
governments’ prior commitments in ways that increase the attractiveness of 
cooperation by raising the costs of non-agreement (Schmidt, 1997; Wallace, 
1996). In particular, the Commission can draw upon its position as the 
‘guardian’ of the Treaty and its responsibility for implementing competition 
policy.
 24    
 
The Commission, for example, has repeatedly threatened legal action 
against the member governments for failing to ensure that their air service 
agreements with third countries respect Treaty requirements, particularly the 
principle of non-discrimination.
25  Thus far this strategy has had little success, 
contributing only to the member governments agreeing a limited mandate for 
negotiations with the US. In October 1998 the Commission (1998) upped the 
ante by referring cases against eight member states  — Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the UK  — to the 
European Court of Justice.  These cases are pending at the time of writing 
(December 2000).  If the Court rules in the Commission’s favor, the acquis will 
more tightly constrain the member governments’ scope for unilateral action, 
increasing the pressure on them to cooperate.   
 
The Commission had more success using its powers under EU 
competition rules to help make a success of the ‘basic’ telecommunications 
services negotiations. The breakthrough in t he negotiations came in November 
1996 when the EU and US in a coordinated move tabled improved offers for 
liberalizing access to their telecommunications markets.  The EU was able to 
make an improved offer because the Commission had leveraged its internal 
competition powers to accelerate the pace of liberalization in some member 
                                                                 
23 For example, although British Airways cannot compete directly with Air France on the 
Paris-New York route, it can compete indirectly flying passengers Paris-London-New York. 
24 Jølstad (1997), for example, notes the Commission’s use of its competition powers to press 
the member governments to compromise during the OECD negotiations on ship-building 
subsidies. 
25 The provisions of virtually all bilateral air service agreements apply only to  airlines of the 
two participating countries.  Under old-style ASAs the airlines are specified by name.  ‘Open-
skies’ agreements do not name specific airlines, but apply to airlines owned and controlled by 
nationals of the participating countries.  This, the Commission argues, conflicts with the 
principle of non-discrimination within the EU, undermines the concept of the EU airline 
established in EU law, and distorts the single market because not being able to offer 
international routes might discourage cross-border investment.  
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states (Commission, 1997).  In particular, it required that Spain accelerate the 
break-up of its voice telephony monopoly as a condition for approving Spanish 
telecommunications company Telefonica’s accession to the Dutch-Swedish-
Swiss alliance Unisource (Commission, 1996b). 
 
The European acquis and Member Government Preferences 
 
In addition to influencing whether the member governments have a choice about 
cooperating and the costs associated with non-cooperation, the acquis can also 
have a more profound influence on their preferences regarding cooperation.  
Again the impact of the  acquis has two components.  The first is that the 
institutionalization of intensive and extensive cooperation makes new 
cooperation appear to be an ‘appropriate’ response (March and Olsen, 1998; 
Risse-Kappen, 1996).  Cooperation is at least considered.  The second is that 
because they are engaged in a long-term process of iterated cooperation, the 
member governments are sometimes willing to sacrifice short-term gains for 
longer-term benefits (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999; Lewis, 2000; Sandholtz, 
1996). Thus, although the member governments need to satisfy their domestic 
constituents, they have choices about ways of doing so, some unilateral, some 
collective.  In addition, membership in the European Union brings benefits, both 
economic (larger markets) and political (greater negotiating weight). The 
member governments therefore have an incentive to support the vibrancy of the 
institution, or at least to avoid undermining it.  
 
The ‘appropriateness’ of cooperation 
 
One striking feature of what we observe is the deeply ingrained habit among EU 
governments of considering cooperation when they do not have to, such that it 
appears to be an almost automatic reaction.  This suggests that the member 
governments consider intra-EU cooperation an ‘appropriate’ potential response 
to almost all external economic challenges.  They may not ultimately select 
cooperation, but they do at least consider it. 
 
The member governments have formally acknowledged the desirability of 
cooperative responses by establishing principles of cooperation in external 
relations in the Treaty, particularly Article 10 (ex-5) of the Treaty of Rome and 
Article 3 (ex-C) of the Treaty on European Union.
26  Although such principles 
leave the governments wiggle room, they do provide focal points around which 
the governments’ expectations about cooperation can converge (Eising and 
Kohler-Koch, 1999). The ‘soft’ institutions (‘modalities’) agreed to structure the 
member governments’ cooperation during the MAI negotiations, for example, 
                                                                 
26 See Majone (2000) on the role of such ‘relational contracting’ as a means of addressing the 
incomplete contracting presented by the Treaties.  
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make explicit reference to Treaty obligations to cooperate and to relevant ECJ 
jurisprudence.  The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 stressed the obligation on the member 
governments and Commission to cooperate closely when engaged in 
negotiations involving issues of mixed competence.   
 
Even with respect to transatlantic air services, where national economic 
interests were very divergent, the member governments consulted and discussed 
whether to respond collectively.  In 1993 they decided that extensive 
cooperation might have its place at some point in the future, but not then.  In 
1996 they agreed to engage in limited ‘targeted’ cooperation with respect to 
regulatory issues.   
 
That the member governments look to each other as a natural grouping in 
external negotiations is underlined by their agreeing to cooperate in both the 
MAI and ‘basic’ telecommunications services negotiations before formally 
discussing what negotiating positions they would adopt. In the case of the MAI 
they agreed to cooperate without having settled how they would structure that 
cooperation.  In both cases, admittedly, the risks associated with cooperation 
were mitigated by the fact that each member government would have to accept 
the final outcome, and so had a firm guarantee that its vital interests could not be 
ignored or overrun.   
 
A longer-term view of preferences 
 
Membership in the EU may also influence how governments understand and 
pursue their interests.  Membership means that the governments are constantly 
interacting across a wide range of policies.  In this context, at the very least, 
narrow short term objectives might be compromised in the anticipation of 
reaping long-term gains (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999; Lewis, 2000; North, 
1990; Sandholtz, 1996; Tsebelis, 1990).  Thus ‘diffuse’ (long-term institutional 
and political) as well as ‘specific’ (short-term, economic) interests matter, and 
the latter may be sacrificed for the former (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace, 1996).  This is more likely to happen when the ‘specific’ 
interests at stake are not that important (economically and politically). 
 
The t endency of the EU’s member governments to take decisions by 
consensus even when qualified majority voting applies (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace, 1997), supports this contention.  As noted above, consensual decision-
making appears to be especially common in foreign economic policy (Hayes, 
1993; Johnson, 1998; Wolf, 1983; Woolcock, 2000).  In particular, it appears as 
though governments that would prefer liberal negotiating positions accept less-
than-liberal common positions. 
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Another indication of governments taking a broader view of their interests 
is t he tendency of the member government holding the rotating six-month 
presidency of the EU to compromise (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997; 
Young and Wallace, 2000). A striking example of this was the Danish 
government’s vote in favor of the protectionist banana trade regime in February 
1993, under its presidency, when in the preceding December and in subsequent 
votes on reforming the regime, it voted against.  Perhaps crucially, Denmark did 
not have strong economic interests at stake. 
 
My cases provide further evidence that tolerance of distasteful common 
negotiating positions facilitates cooperation.  Specifically, the more liberal 
member governments seemed to tolerate negotiating positions that are 
substantially less liberal than they would like.  This was t he case in both the 
‘basic’ telecommunications and MAI negotiations.  In both negotiations the 
more liberal member governments accepted that audio-visual services would 
effectively be excluded from the agreement.  In the MAI negotiations the more 
liberal g overnments also supported special treatment for regional economic 
integration organizations.  In the ‘basic’ telecommunications services 
negotiations the more liberal member governments did not put pressure on other 
member governments to accelerate their i nternal liberalizations in order to make 
external concessions.  Such compromises, however, do not appear to have been 
a factor with respect to transatlantic air services.  Here the more protectionist 
governments have persistently resisted a common (liberal) position. 
 
 
The Framing, not Determining, Role of the acquis 
 
Although the features of the acquis discussed above increase the likelihood of 
cooperation in various ways, the member governments retain significant 
discretion.  Even where the exclusive competence has passed to the EU, the 
member governments can choose not to cooperate, although they cannot legally 
negotiate unilaterally.  However, one would expect that the more constraining 
the unintended constraint, the greater the degree of internal interdependence and 
the higher the cost of non-agreement, the more likely cooperation is.  A decisive 
factor, however, remains the congruence of the member governments’ economic 
interests.  The institutionalization of interaction only increase tolerance; it is not 
absolute or unquestioning.  When really vital interests are threatened 
(particularly for little apparent gain), cooperation is less likely or is likely to 
break down. 
 
In transatlantic air services, for example, the constraints imposed by the 
acquis are quite weak and are largely restricted to regulatory issues.  Indirect 
competition is a problem for some European airlines, but it is the member  
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governments of those airlines for which it is less of an issue that are most 
resistant to a common position.  Although cooperation has been discussed, the 
economic interests at stake are sufficiently important and different that the 
member governments have not agreed to cooperate on the crucial issue of traffic 
rights. 
 
The constraints imposed by the acquis were slightly more of an issue in 
the MAI negotiations, although responsibility for the bulk of the substance of 
the negotiation resided with the member governments.  The degree of policy 
interdependence within the EU with respect to FDI is contested.  The French 
government, for one, contends that third-country firms that are established in an 
EU member state do not benefit from the right of establishment.  Thus a third-
country firm could not circumvent French restrictions by first investing in a 
more liberal member state.  In addition, there were important differences in the 
member government’s interests.  The French government’s main objectives - 
special treatment for regional economic integration organizations and audio-
visual services on the one hand and disciplines on sub-national governments and 
reduction of the US government's list of exceptions - were the issues on which 
the US appeared intransigent.  With apparently little to gain and potentially 
much to lose, the French government withdrew from the talks in October 1998. 
 
The differentiated impact of the acquis on cooperation is summarized in Table 
2.  
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The conventional wisdom has it that the failure of the Treaty-base of the 
European Union’s foreign economic policy to keep pace with the development of 
the international economic agenda prevents the EU from acting coherently and 
effectively in international trade negotiations.
27  My analysis suggests that this 
concern is exaggerated. The EU has actually encountered remarkably few 
problems in participating in international negotiations that address issues falling 
outside the common commercial policy.  Further, cooperation has occurred even 
when the member governments’ economic interests have not been congruent.  In 
such circumstances, the absence of formal arrangements may actually enhance the 
likelihood and effectiveness of collective EU participation, because they are not 
required to agree common positions on all aspects of a negotiation. 
 
As my focus is on extending cooperation within a highly institutionalized 
international organization, one would expect the institutions to play a role.  
Significantly, the EU’s institutional framework plays an unintended role beyond 
its original scope.  Specifically, cooperation is required across a broader range of 
foreign economic policy than most member governments wish.  Further, the 
iterated process of cooperation has led member governments to consider 
cooperation an appropriate response to external economic challenges.  It also 
appears as though, at the very least, member governments are more willing to 
compromise in the short-run in order to secure broader, longer-term aims.  These 
considerations are likely to have the greatest impact at the margins, where vital 
interests are not at stake.  None the less, such an impact may have important 
implications for the likelihood of cooperation. 
   
Although the EU is by far and a way the most highly institutionalized 
international organization in the world, some of the implications of my analysis 
have broader relevance.  With the introduction of binding dispute settlement in 
the WTO, for example, there are already indications that the significance of 
prior commitments can change through legal interpretation.   Additionally, the 
threat of legal action, backed up by sanctions, by shaping the cost of non-
agreement, has implications for the preferences and relative bargaining power of 
the WTO’s members when they consider cooperation in new areas, including 
potentially in multilateral environmental agreements. 
   
                                                                 
27 The Treaty of Nice has not eliminated the problem.  The Commission’s (2000: 2) 
assessment of the agreement, for example, is that ‘the progress made in improving the 
operation of the EU’s trade policy is modest.’  In particular, it considers it ‘unfortunate’ that 
the Treaty did not bring FDI (except in services) within the scope of the common commercial 
policy (p. 1).  
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Other aspects of the analysis will gain greater relevance if other regional 
trade agreements develop further.  Moves to remove internal barriers could lead 
to the interlocking of intra- and extra- interdependencies that we already see in 
the EU.  This effect, of course, intensifies the m ore liberal the internal regime 
becomes.  In addition, repeated interaction among the members of regional trade 
arrangements could be expected to cause the participating governments to at 
least evaluate courses of action in the light of the implications for the regional 
arrangement.  Although the current state of regional trade areas is not such that 
we should expect to see such behavior soon, in time it might become more 
prevalent, if not reaching the levels seen within the EU. 
 
Alasdair R. Young  (EUI)  
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